Abstract: Kant's notion of 'discipline' has received considerable attention from scholars of his philosophy of education, but its role in his theoretical philosophy has been largely ignored. This omission is surprising since his discussion of discipline in the first Critique is not only more extensive and expansive in scope than his other discussions but also predates them. The goal of this essay is to provide a comprehensive reading of the Discipline that emphasizes its systematic importance in the first Critique.
The goal of this essay is to provide a comprehensive reading of the Discipline that emphasizes its systematic importance in the first Critique. In doing so, I shall be cutting against the grain of Kant interpretation which from Kemp Smith onwards has tended to regard the Doctrine of Method and, hence, the Discipline as a dispensable part of the Critique. 3 In brief, the reading I will defend is that the goal of the Discipline is to establish a set of rules for the use of pure reason that, if followed, will mitigate and perhaps even eliminate our tendency to make judgments about supersensible objects. Like Descartes' Regulae, then, the Discipline introduces us to a number of habits of mind that Kant believes are advantageous to inquiry. But while Descartes believes that his rules constitute a method for discovering truth, Kant believes that his are merely a means for avoiding a certain kind of error, namely the error or 'deception' associated with transcendental illusion. Further, since Kant's justification for these rules relies crucially on claims he has defended in the Doctrine of Elements, I argue that, far from being a dispensable part of the Critique, the Discipline is the culmination of Kant's critique of metaphysics.
After introducing Kant's notion of transcendental illusion and, following Michelle Grier, elaborating on the distinction between this illusion and the deception associated with it, I proceed to examine some of the textual evidence for my primary interpretative claim: that the goal of the Discipline is to provide us with a set of rules to mitigate or eliminate this deception (section one). 4 Having provided a general defense of this claim, I then formulate the specific rules Kant endorses in the Discipline, sketch his arguments for them, and indicate the ways in which these arguments rely on the results of the Doctrine of Elements (sections two and three). Finally, I
briefly summarize the results of my analysis and elaborate on the reasons it should lead us to regard the Discipline as the culmination of Kant's critique of metaphysics (section four).
ILLUSION AND DECEPTION
Kant introduces transcendental illusion by means of a comparison between it and two more mundane forms of illusion: empirical (or optical) illusion and logical illusion. The former are things like straight oars that look bent in the water, square towers that look round in the distance, and the change in the apparent size of the moon when it moves from the horizon upward in the night sky. The latter, which Kant also characterizes as a 'mere imitation of the form of inference', are simply mistakes in logical reasoning (A296/B353). The source of empirical illusion is external, certain facts about our environment and visual system, while the source of logical illusion is internal, our failure to follow logical rules. Further, while logical illusion can be eliminated by exercising care in judgment, empirical illusion is, in a certain sense, ineliminable. Try though we might, we cannot make the stick look straight, although we may succeed in not judging it to be so.
Transcendental illusion combines elements of these other two forms of illusion. Like logical illusion, its origin is within our own minds, and in particular in the confusion of the subjective principle that reason must seek the 'unconditioned for conditioned cognitions of the understanding' with the objective principle that the unconditioned is given (A307/B365). 5 The former is a claim about the nature of reason and, indeed, one that describes what Kant regards as its principal activity, while the latter is a claim about the existence of objects that allow reason to complete or fully realize this activity. But like empirical illusion, transcendental illusion is ineliminable. Just as one can learn the cause of the moon illusion without thereby eliminating the illusion itself, transcendental illusion 'does not cease even though it is uncovered and its nullity is clearly seen into by transcendental critique' (A297/B353). Further, transcendental illusion is both the origin of special metaphysics (the part of Wolffian metaphysics that deals with the objects: God, the soul, and the world), insofar as it constitutes the subjective source of our ideas of these objects as well as our tendency to make knowledge claims about them, and of the regulative principles of reason, such as the principle of parsimony, that allow us to systematize our empirical knowledge of the world. 6 Thus, it is fortunate that Kant consistently draws a distinction between transcendental illusion and the deception associated with it. The former, with many details omitted, is the confusion of subjective and objective principles described in the previous paragraph, while the latter is any attempt to make knowledge claims about the objects of special metaphysics, the ideas of which are a result of this confusion. Kant describes the goal of the Dialectic as an attempt to uncover 'the illusion in transcendental judgments, while at the same time protecting us from being deceived by it' (A297/B354). And when he begins his discussion of the regulative use of the ideas of reason, he emphasizes that the 'illusion' arising from this use is one that 'can be prevented from deceiving' (A644/B672). Transcendental illusion can thus be ineliminable and a source of positive regulative principles without undermining the success of Kant's critique of metaphysics, for eliminating the deception, not the illusion itself, is what is essential to this critique.
How, then, is this deception supposed to be eliminated? There can be no doubt that part of the work is done by the analysis of the dialectical inferences of reason in Book Two of the Dialectic, for it is here that Kant identifies the mistakes that give the arguments of German special metaphysics the appearance of legitimacy. But this task cannot be completed in the Dialectic since Kant makes clear that merely identifying the cause of transcendental illusion is not enough to prevent us from being deceived by it. The 'natural and unavoidable dialectic of pure reason,' he emphasizes, is such that 'even after we have exposed the mirage it will not cease to lead our reason on with false hopes, continually propelling it into momentary aberrations that always need to be removed' (A297/B354). 7 Thus, even if we accept the Dialectic's analysis of the cause of transcendental illusion, we will still find ourselves tempted to make precisely the kinds of claims about supersensible objects that constitute the most celebrated part of the metaphysical view Kant means to overturn.
It is the Discipline that, I suggest, completes the work of eliminating transcendental deception begun in the Dialectic. Kant begins the Discipline with a general description of what he calls 'negative judgments'. These are judgments about the limitations of our cognitive abilities, and Kant emphasizes that their sole purpose is to prevent error (A709/B737). In contexts where error is unlikely, negative judgments are moot, 'like the proposition of the scholastic orator that Alexander could not have conquered any lands without an army' (A709/B737). But in contexts where error is likely, these judgments are not only important but more important than judgments that increase our knowledge. And the need for negative judgments is particularly acute in the field of metaphysics:
[…] where the limits of our possible cognition are very narrow, where the temptation to judge is great, where the illusion that presents itself is very deceptive, and where the disadvantage of error is very serious, there the negative in instruction, which serves merely to defend us from errors, is more important than many a positive teaching by means of which our cognition could be augmented. (A709/B737)
Since sole purpose of negative judgments is to prevent error, the task of the Discipline can only be to eliminate the deception associated with transcendental illusion.
Kant's subsequent characterization of discipline only bolsters this conclusion. Discipline is the 'compulsion through which the constant propensity to stray from certain rules is limited and finally eradicated' (A709/B737). This is a general characterization and can certainly be applied to things other than reason. 8 But if we take it as a characterization of the discipline of reason, as Kant encourages us to do, the 'certain rules' referred to can only be the prohibition against the use of the categories to cognize the supersensible that Kant attempts to establish in the Doctrine of Elements, and the 'constant propensity' to stray from these rules can only be the temptation to use the categories in this prohibited way brought about by transcendental illusion.
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To limit or eliminate this propensity, then, is equivalent to limiting or eliminating transcendental deception.
But as I have already suggested, the fact that eliminating transcendental deception is the primary goal of the Discipline does not imply that the other parts of the Critique make no contribution to this goal. Indeed, Kant emphasizes that the Doctrine of Elements has already disciplined pure reason with regard to its 'content' and that the task of the Discipline is to discipline pure reason with regard to its 'method' (A712/B740). Disciplining the content of pure reason, I suggest, amounts to establishing that pure reason is not a source of speculative cognition at all or, as Kant puts it in the opening of the Canon, that it 'accomplishes nothing in its pure use' (A795/B823). Understood in this way, Kant's comment suggests that one way the Doctrine of Elements contributes to the elimination of transcendental deception is that each of its parts (the Aesthetic, Analytic, and Dialectic) helps to establish this claim.
In the next section of this essay, I will argue that another way the Doctrine of Elements contributes to the elimination of transcendental deception is that Kant appeals to its results in order to justify the rules restricting the use of pure reason he introduces in the Discipline. For the moment, however, I want to establish that this strategy of appealing to the prior results of the is to provide a defense of four rules for the use of pure reason that, if followed, will mitigate and potentially eliminate the misuse of reason brought about by transcendental illusion. They are:
1.
Pure reason should not use the mathematical method because philosophy does not contain the elements required for this method: definitions, axioms, and demonstrations.
2.
Pure reason has no legitimate skeptical use. That is, it should not be used to eliminate metaphysical conflicts simply by opposing arguments to each other or by showing that particular attempts at rational cognition fail.
3.
Hypotheses about supersensible objects should not be used as explanatory devices in science or common sense judgments about the world, and their only permissible use is as a means to undermine dogmatic claims about supersensible objects.
4.
Any attempt to establish rational cognition of supersensible objects must adhere to the rules of transcendental proof. And when these rules are understood, we learn that there can be no such cognition.
Kant never formulates these rules as explicitly as I have done, but each expresses the main conclusion of one of the four sections of the Discipline. And as we proceed, I will quote the places in the text where Kant's formulations come closest to the ones I have provided. Since
Kant's defense of the second rule is more difficult to piece together than the other three, I will postpone discussion of it until the next section. In the remainder of this section, I will examine his defenses of rules 1, 3 and 4, indicating the ways in which they rely on the results of the Doctrine of Elements. Mathematics gives the most resplendent example of pure reason happily expanding itself without assistance from experience. Examples are contagious, especially for the same faculty, which naturally flatters itself that it will have the same good fortune in other cases that it has had in one. Hence pure reason hopes to be able to expand itself in as happy and well grounded a way in its transcendental use as it succeeded in doing in its mathematical use, by applying the same method in the former case that was of such evident certainty in the latter. It is therefore very important for us to know whether the method for obtaining apodictic certainty that one calls mathematical in the latter science is identical with that by means of which one seeks the same certainty in philosophy, and that would there have to be called dogmatic.
The belief that the mathematical method could be successfully applied in philosophy was, of course, a central tenet of German rationalism. 13 So Kant's argument that it cannot addresses a natural response to his criticisms of traditional metaphysics in the Critique.
14 After formulating the problem he will address, Kant next elaborates on the differences between philosophical and mathematical cognition. The former is 'rational cognition from concepts', while the latter is rational cognition 'from the construction of concepts' (A713/B741). Further, to construct a concept according to Kant is 'to exhibit a priori the intuition corresponding to it' or, in slightly less Kantian terms, to construct a figure in intuition that expresses the content of the concept (ibid). 15 Both philosophical and mathematical cognition are rational in the sense that each is guided by reason, both in its capacity as the faculty of mediate inference as in its regulative use. 16 However, despite the fact that the phrase 'rational cognition from concepts' might lead one to believe that Kant is describing philosophical cognition sensu his rationalist opponents, Kant is clear that this distinction is to be understood as one within his own theory of cognition. In a subsequent passage, he emphasizes that both mathematical and philosophical cognition have an essential relation to intuition. 17 It is thus the suitability of the mathematical method to Kant's own account of philosophical cognition that is at issue in the first section of the Discipline.
The distinction between philosophical and mathematical cognition, for which I have provided only the barest of sketches, sets the stage for the main argument in section one, namely that the mathematical method is not suited for philosophical investigation and, in particular, for the investigations into supersensible objects that claim to proceed by means of pure reason alone.
That is, although Kant frames his argument in terms of philosophical cognition in general, his primary aim is to show that the mathematical method is not suited to the kinds of arguments examined in the Dialectic. Thus, he comments that his argument is necessary because pure reason hopes that 'it can stave off having to give up entirely the effort to get beyond the bounds of experience into the charming regions of the intellectual' despite Kant's previous efforts to determine its bounds (A726/B754 Kant's argument proceeds in four steps. Since the mathematical method asks us to prove propositions by using definitions, axioms, and demonstrations, Kant will show that 'none of these elements, in the sense in which the mathematician takes them, can be achieved or imitated by philosophy' (steps [1] [2] [3] and that philosophy therefore cannot use the mathematical method (step 4) (A727/B755). Although Kant has previously discussed definitions in the Analytic, his characterization of definition in the Discipline bears little resemblance to his earlier treatment and is largely independent of his claims about the differences between mathematical and philosophical cognition. 18 But his characterizations of mathematical axioms and demonstrations rely heavily on these differences as well as the distinction between mathematical and dynamical principles of pure understanding introduced in the second chapter of the Analytic of Principles.
As a result, the conclusions of the second and third steps of Kant's argument follow without much argument from the initial characterizations Kant gives. Given that the task of the Doctrine of Method is to apply the results of the Doctrine of Elements, this too is exactly what we should expect.
To define according to Kant is 'to exhibit originally the exhaustive concept of a thing within its boundaries' (A727/B755). 'Exhaustive' (ausführlich) is a term from Wolffian logic. A concept is exhaustive when it contains enough marks or predicates for us to always recognize the objects that fall under it and never confuse them with others. Meier illustrates this distinction in the following way. The concept of the color red is an exhaustive concept since someone possessing it will always be able to identify instances of red and not confuse them with instances of other colors, say blue. But if we can only taste that a wine is red but not that it is a cabernet, merlot or some other kind of red wine, then our concepts of these kinds of wines are not (ibid). What makes a definition 'original', however, is that the determination of the marks that make it exhaustive 'is not derived from anywhere else and thus [not] in need of proof' (ibid). A definition is thus a particular kind of exhaustive concept, namely one in which it is in some sense self-evident that the marks it contains are sufficient for identifying the objects that are supposed to fall under it.
Kant's (and my) gloss on the originality of a concept is, admittedly, somewhat thin. But his argument that philosophy has no definitions in the mathematical sense does not rely on their originality but on their exhaustiveness. 20 Suppose that I know the definition of something and you want to know it as well. Suppose also that I am not willing to simply tell you the definition but only to tell you whether a particular mark is part of it or not. While you would surely be able to identify a number of the marks in the definition and could, in principle, identify all of them, you would have no guarantee that you had identified them all without knowing how many marks were in the definition to begin with. At best, you could say that it was highly probable but not certain that you had identified them all.
Kant believes we are in a similar situation with regard to all concepts that are 'given a priori' (A728/B756). 21 Although these concepts are given to us a priori, they are given 'confusedly'. That is, we are aware of them and able to apply them but do not have a distinct conception of all their constituent marks. And while we can make these concepts more distinct by identifying objects that fall under them and asking ourselves in virtue of what properties they do, we can never be certain that we have identified all of the marks of the concept, much less that we have identified all and only those marks that would allow us to always identify the objects falling under it. As a result, the most we can say is that it is highly probable but not certain that we have identified the marks that would make our concept exhaustive and thus, apart from the question of its originality, capable of being a definition. Kant puts this argument in the following way:
For I can never be certain that the distinct representation of a (still confusedly) given concept has been exhaustively developed unless I know that it is adequate to the object. But since the concept of the latter, as it [i.e. the concept] is given, can contain many obscure representations, which we pass by in our analysis though we always use them in application, the exhaustiveness of the analysis of my concept is always doubtful, and by many appropriate examples can only be made probable but never apodictically certain.
In order to emphasize the possibility that our analysis of an a priori concept may always be incomplete, Kant prefers to call this analysis the exposition of concepts rather than the definition.
I now turn to Kant's characterizations of axioms and demonstrations, the second and third steps of his argument. The first are 'immediately certain' synthetic a priori principles, and the second are 'intuitive' apodictic proofs (A732-4/B760-2). The idea of a principle that is both synthetic a priori and immediate or of a proof that is intuitive might be thought to point to an obvious explanation of why axioms and demonstrations so understood are not part of philosophy.
In particular, it might seem that axioms and demonstrations as Kant here characterizes them are inconsistent with the dependency of our cognition on concepts and intuitions. Since Kant is operating within the confines of his account of cognition, however, this explanation cannot be the right one. Rather, Kant is tacitly invoking the distinction between mathematical and dynamical principles introduced in the second chapter of the Analytic. Here he distinguishes between mathematical principles that pertain 'merely to intuition' and dynamical principles that pertain 'to the existence of an appearance in general' (A160/B199). While both kinds of principles are necessary, Kant claims that mathematical principles are 'unconditionally necessary' and thus 'apodictic' but that dynamical principles are necessary 'only under the condition of empirical thinking in experience' and thus 'only mediately and indirectly' (ibid).
Moreover, mathematical principles are capable of 'intuitive certainty', while dynamical principles are 'capable only of a discursive certainty' (A162/B201). Axioms and demonstrations cannot be part of philosophy, then, because philosophical cognition does not have the immediacy and intuitive certainty that characterizes mathematical cognition.
Having argued that definitions, axioms, and demonstrations cannot be found in philosophy, Kant concludes his justification for Rule 1 as follows:
Now from all of this it follows that it is not suited to the nature of philosophy, especially in the field of pure reason, to strut about with a dogmatic gait and to decorate itself with the titles and ribbons of mathematics, to whose ranks philosophy does not belong, although it has every cause to hope for a sisterly union with it. (A735/B763, my emphasis)
As I have suggested, Kant's emphasis on the implications of his argument for pure reason is consistent with the Discipline's aim of providing us with a set of rules to limit or eliminate transcendental deception. Kant begins by outlining two criteria for a hypothesis, which he understands as the supposition of the existence of some entity whose actual existence is not known. The first is that the object, the entity whose existence is hypothesized, is possible. The second is that the object 'be connected as a ground of explanation with that which is already given' (A770/B798). The first of these criteria is necessary to distinguish ideas created 'under the strict oversight of reason' from mere creations of the imagination and the second to emphasize that the value of a hypothesis is its ability to provide an explanation for something that is unknown or not sufficiently understood. But the conception of possibility Kant has in mind is not logical possibility or the mere absence of contradiction in the concept of the object whose existence one would hypothesize but real possibility or the agreement of the concept 'with the formal conditions of experience in general' (A220/B268). In order for an object to be a real possibility, then, it must be an object of possible experience; that is, it must be an object in space and time with an extensive and intensive magnitude that is subject to the Analogies of Experience. As Kant puts it: 'In a word: it is only possible for our reason to use the conditions of possible experience as conditions of the possibility of things' (A771/B799).
On the basis of this initial characterization of a hypothesis, Kant then argues that there can be no legitimate 'transcendental hypotheses' or suppositions about the existence of supersensible objects. Since we have no knowledge whatsoever of supersensible objects, no supposition of the existence of such an object will be able to provide a 'ground of explanation' for something 'already given' in experience. And without being able to fill this explanatory role even in principle, such a supposition would fail to be a genuine hypothesis. As Kant puts it:
A transcendental hypothesis, in which a mere idea of reason would be used for the explanation of things in nature, would thus be no explanation at all, since that which one does not adequately understand on the basis of known empirical principles would be explained by means of something about which one understands nothing at all. (A772/B800) But in addition to not being genuine hypotheses that help us understand nature, Kant argues that transcendental hypotheses are also harmful to the development of our knowledge. In particular, he argues that they discourage inquiry by giving those who resort to them the mistaken impression that they have actually understood the phenomenon they are investigating. And it is for both of these reasons that Kant concludes: 'Transcendental hypotheses of the speculative use of reason and a freedom to make good the lack of physical grounds of explanation by using all sorts of hyperphysical ones can never be permitted at all' (A773/B801).
Despite the fact that they cannot be used to establish any claim, transcendental
hypotheses do have what Kant calls a 'polemical' or 'defensive' use (A776/B804). That is, they can be used to argue against dogmatic claims about supersensible objects by showing that anyone making these claims is unable to exclude various possibilities that are incompatible with their claims. Thus, if someone asserts dogmatically that the soul cannot be immaterial because 'experience seems to prove that the elevation and derangement of our mental powers are merely different modifications of our organs', Kant suggests that we could weaken this argument by hypothesizing 'that our body is nothing but the fundamental appearance to which the entire faculty of sensibility and therewith all thinking are related, as their condition, in our present state (of life)' and that '[s]eparation from our body would be the end of this sensible use […] and the beginning of the intellectual' (A778/B806). Of course, this hypothesis is not something that could be proven or even something that Kant, when he is being more precise, would want to call a genuine hypothesis. But it undermines the dogmatic assertion that the soul is material because it presents a logical possibility that, because no one is really in a position to know anything about the soul, the person making this dogmatic claim cannot exclude.
This polemical use of transcendental hypotheses could just as easily be used to undermine dogmatic assertions of the claims of special metaphysics as to undermine their denials. But it is the use of reason to combat the latter that is Kant's focus. Thus, in his elaboration on the polemical use of reason, he emphasizes that this use of reason will frustrate 'the opponent's illusory insights, which would demolish our own asserted propositions' (A776/B804). What are these propositions that Kant suggests both he and his reader assert? They cannot be the denials of the claims of special metaphysics, but neither can they be the assertions of these claims since our ability to assert both has been undermined by the arguments of the Doctrine of Elements. Rather, Kant suggests that they are the assertions of these claims on practical grounds. After commenting that speculative reason favors neither the assertion nor the denial of these claims, he gestures toward the arguments of the Canon:
In will be shown in what follows, however, that in regard to its practical use reason still has the right to assume something which it would in no way be warranted in presupposing in the field of mere speculation without sufficient grounds of proof; for all such presuppositions injure the perfection of speculation, about which, however, the practical interest does not trouble itself at all. (A776/B804)
And it is in defense of these claims that Kant believes the polemical use of transcendental hypotheses has its greatest use. The passage continues as follows:
There it thus has a possession the legitimacy of which need not be proved, and the proof of which it could not in fact give. The opponent should therefore prove. But since he no more knows something about the object that is doubted that would establish its non-being than does the former, who asserts its actuality, here an advantage on the side of he who asserts something as a practically necessary proposition (melior est condition possidentis) is revealed. He is, namely, free to use, as it were in an emergency, the very same means for his good cause as his opponent would use against it, i.e. to use the hypotheses that do not serve to strengthen the proof of it but serve only to show that the opponent understands far too little about the object of the dispute to be able to flatter himself with an advantage in speculative insight over us. (A776-7/B804-5)
The polemical use of reason can therefore play an important role in defending the practical claims of reason by reminding us that any speculative denial of those claims is on shaky ground. (A777/B805).
Rule 4:
The fourth section of the Discipline, 'The discipline of pure reason in regard to its proofs', explicitly formulates the rules for the proofs of synthetic a priori philosophical propositions that Kant has used implicitly throughout the Critique and evaluates pure reason's ability to use these 'transcendental proofs' to gain knowledge of supersensible objects. 23 More specifically, Kant argues that any attempt to cognize objects through pure reason should follow these rules but that actually attempting to do so reveals quite quickly that this kind of cognition is impossible. The final section of the Discipline is thus the counterpart to Kant's discussion of the mathematical method in section one. Just as he there argued that the mathematical method could not be used to acquire knowledge of the objects of special metaphysics because the differences between mathematical and philosophical cognition make the use of this method in philosophy impossible, Kant here argues that the method he believes actually underlies philosophical cognition and has tacitly supposed throughout the Critique cannot be used to acquire this kind of knowledge either. As a result, pure reason is left without any method for its speculative use. And this is perhaps the best argument of all that its legitimate uses can only be regulative and practical.
According to Kant, the method of transcendental proof has three rules. The first is that one should not attempt to prove a synthetic a priori proposition 'without having first considered whence one can justifiably derive the principles on which one intends to build and with what right one can expect success in inferences from them' (A786/B814). The second is that there can be only one proof for each synthetic a priori proposition (A787/B815). And the third is that these proofs must be direct or 'ostensive' and not indirect or 'apagogic' (A789/B817). The result of a sincere attempt to use these rules to guide our attempts to acquire cognition through pure reason is, Kant believes, the realization that this cognition is impossible.
Consider the first of these rules. Determining 'whence one can justifiably derive the principles' one wants and the right to expect successful inferences when using them amounts to regarding the third rule, he argues that any attempt to prove a pure rational principle directly will fail because, as we saw in the previous paragraph, the only principles that are objectively valid at all and thus suitable for inclusion in a proof are the principles of the understanding, and they are valid only for objects of possible experience. Consequently, any attempt to give a direct proof of any claim of special metaphysics will serve only to reveal 'dogmatic illusion, and compel pure reason to surrender its exaggerated pretensions in its speculative use, and to draw back within the boundaries of its proper territory, namely practical principles' (A794/B822).
THE 'SKEPTICAL USE' OF PURE REASON
As I suggested at the beginning of the previous section, Kant ' But for reason to leave just these doubts standing, and to set out to recommend the conviction and confession of its ignorance, not merely as a cure for dogmatic self-conceit but also as the way in which to end the conflict of reason with itself, is an entirely vain attempt, by no means suitable for arranging a peaceful retirement for reason; rather it is at best only a means for awaking it from its sweet dogmatic dreams in order to undertake a more careful examination of its condition. (A757/B785) When he claims that there is 'no permissible skeptical use of pure reason', then, at least one thing Kant means is that letting reason use the skeptical method to examine conflicting claims about supersensible objects is an ineffective way to end these conflicts. Merely reflecting on the fact that there are equally compelling arguments for conflicting claims in the field of speculative philosophy or on the individual arguments themselves is not enough to show us that supersensible objects cannot be objects of cognition and therefore not enough to persuade us to limit our reflections to the narrow bounds that Kant outlines in the Doctrine of Elements. In the above passage, then, Kant is explicitly contrasting his approach to the elimination of these conflicts, the discipline of reason, with the skeptical method. But since there are many philosophers-most notably Hume-who believe that 'this skeptical manner of withdrawing from a tedious quarrel of reason' is a shortcut 'for arriving at an enduring philosophical tranquility', Kant introduces his discussion of the impossibility of a 'skeptical satisfaction of pure reason' by commenting that the popularity of the skeptical approach makes it 'necessary to exhibit this manner of thought in its true light' (A757/B785).
But as I have said, the focus of Kant's explicit discussion of Hume's views is his account of causation. And it is this account that he connects with Hume's attempt to eliminate the deception brought about by transcendental illusion:
The famous David Hume was one of these geographers of human reason, who took himself to have satisfactorily disposed of these questions [of pure reason] by having expelled them outside the horizon of human reason, which however he could not determine. He dwelt primarily on the principle of causality, and quite rightly remarked about that that one could not base its truth (indeed not even the objective validity of the concept of an efficient cause in general) on any insight at all, i.e. a priori cognition, and thus that the authority of this law is not constituted in the least by its necessity, but only by its merely general usefulness in the course of experience and a subjective necessity arising therefrom, which he called custom. Now from the incapacity of reason in general to make use of this principle that goes beyond all experience, he inferred the nullity of all what he believes is a necessary condition for any successful attempt to eliminate transcendental deception. It is not enough to show that some or all of our past or current attempts to cognize supersensible objects have failed. Rather, we must show that these objects are necessarily beyond our cognitive grasp. And one cannot establish this stronger claim empirically but only by providing a critique of reason:
But that my ignorance is absolutely necessary and hence absolves me from all further investigation can never be made out empirically, from observation, but only critically by getting to the bottom of the primary sources of our cognition. Thus the determination of the boundaries of our reason can only take place in accordance with a priori grounds; its limitation, however which is a merely indeterminate cognition of an ignorance that is never completely to be lifted, can also be cognized a posteriori, through what which always remains to be known even with all knowledge. The former cognition of ignorance, which is possible only by means of the critique of reason itself, is thus science, the latter is nothing but perception, about which one cannot see how far the inference from it might reach. (A758/B786)
In this passage, Kant introduces the distinction between the empirical determination of limits and the critical determination of boundaries and claims that only the latter can justify an end to our attempts to cognize supersensible objects because only the latter can show that our ignorance of objects is necessary.
Kant then proceeds to illustrate the determination of limits by asking us to imagine the surface of the earth as a flat surface. If we conceive the earth in this way, we have no way to determine its size. Rather, all we can say is that wherever we go, we see a space in which we could move farther (A759/B786). For all we know, the earth might be unlimited in size, or it might end on the other side of an unexplored hill that is presently beyond our perception. All we can determine about the size of a flat earth, then, is the extent of our actual knowledge of it, and this is an example of what Kant calls the determination of limits. The determination of our actual knowledge of the earth is empirical and does not support any conclusion about how much more of the earth is or is not out there waiting to be discovered. Consequently, it cannot be used to justify an end to our investigation.
But if we instead imagine the surface of the earth as a sphere, we will be able to calculate the size of the entire earth from the length of even the smallest arc of this sphere. And Kant thinks of this calculation as a determination of the earth's boundary. Because it involves the use of geometry, this determination proceeds according to a priori principles. More importantly, because it assigns the earth a determinate size, determining the earth's boundary also allows us to determine the extent of our possible knowledge of the earth and in turn to show in a principled way that and where our investigations of the earth must necessarily end. As he puts it:
But if I have gotten as far as knowing that the earth is a sphere and its surface the surface of a sphere, then from a small part of the latter, e.g. from the magnitude of one degree, I can cognize its diameter and, by means of this, the complete boundary, i.e. the surface of the sphere, determinately and in accordance with a priori principles; although I am ignorant in regard to the objects that this surface might contain, I am not ignorant in regard to the magnitude and limits of the domain that contains them. (A759/B787)
Determining the earth's boundary is thus similar to the critique of pure reason in two important respects. Just as the former uses the a priori principles of geometry to determine the extent of our possible knowledge of the earth, the latter uses the a priori principles of the Aesthetic and Analytic to determine the extent of our possible knowledge in general. And just as the former is able to determine the proper objects of geographical inquiry, the latter is able to determine the proper objects of inquiry in general.
But Hume's empirical account of cognition determines limits not boundaries. As Kant puts it, Hume 'merely limits our understanding without drawing boundaries for it' (A767/B795). In contrast to the geographer of the flat world Kant has just imagined, however, Kant's views on education include Weisskopf 1970 , Funke 1974 , Munzel 1991 , Louden 2000 , Munzel 2003 , and Wilson 2006 In what follows, 'Discipline' will refer to this portion of the Critique and 'discipline' to the notion discussed therein.
3 Kemp Smith (1918: 563) writes that the 'entire teaching' of the Method 'has already been more or less exhaustively expounded in the earlier divisions of the Critique', and his discussion of the Discipline omits section three entirely and devotes only one sentence to section two. Similarly, Bird (2006: 739) writes that the Method merely 'summarizes' the work of the Doctrine of Elements and limits his discussion of the Discipline to section one. And apart from the Canon, Moore (2010: 311) regards Kant's discussion of transcendental proof as the 'really significant' contribution of the Method, which at least suggests that its other contributions are incidental.
Gehrhart 1998 is a notable exception to the tendency to downplay the significance of the Method. 4 See Grier 2001, Introduction, esp. 8-11 and Chapter 4, esp. 111-6 and 128-30. Note, however, that my terminology differs from Grier's. She uses the phrase 'judgmental error' to refer to the deception associated with transcendental illusion, which I will generally refer to as 'transcendental deception' or simply 'deception'. It seems to me that this terminological choice represents less of a departure from Kant's own language, since he frequently distinguishes illusion (Schein, Illusion) from deception (Betrug), but it does not reflect a departure from the substance of Grier's view on this issue. Allison's reconstruction of Kant's argument for transcendental illusion. 6 The dual role of transcendental illusion is emphasized by Grier (2001: 101-39, 263-301) . See A652-4/B680-2 for Kant's discussion of parsimony.
7 Additional 'negative' evidence for this claim can be found at A308-9/B365-6 and A703/B731, passages that discuss the aims of the Dialectic and make no reference to transcendental deception. 8 Indeed, Kant gives similar characterizations of discipline in the Lectures on Pedagogy at 9:442 and 9:452. 9 On this reading, Kant's suggestion that our propensity to stray from these rules can be
'eliminated' appears to be in tension with his comment at A297/B354, quoted previously, that transcendental illusion 'continually' propels us into 'momentary aberrations that always need to be removed'. Perhaps the latter comment is true only of the individual whose reason has not been disciplined according to the rules of the Discipline, or perhaps this tension reflects an uncertainty 14 Kant develops a second argument for this claim at A736-8/B764-6 that I will not consider.
Following the suggestion of the previous quotation, this argument identifies the mathematical method with the dogmatic method and argues that pure reason contains no dogma and that reason's use of the dogmatic method is therefore per se inappropriate.
15 For a more detailed discussion of the constructability of mathematical concepts, see Lisa Shabel 2006. 16 Kant introduces the former capacity at A303/B360 and the latter at A644/B672. 17 See A720/B748. 18 For this discussion, see A240-6/B300-3. There Kant's argument is that none of the categories can be defined 'without immediately descending to the conditions of sensibility' (A241/B300).
In contrast, his view in the Discipline is that, even if we descend to the 'conditions of sensibility', no a priori concepts (including but not limited to the categories) can be defined.
19 See Meier 1752 : §132. Cf. Wolff 2003 I will here ignore Kant's argument that empirical and arbitrary concepts cannot be defined in the same sense that mathematical concepts can. These arguments are interesting, but they are only of secondary importance to the conclusion this section draws about the use of pure reason. 21 The adverb 'given' is meant to contrast these a priori concepts with the a priori constructed concepts of mathematics. 24 Admittedly, this is a weak argument since the fact that rationalist philosophers have not yet reached a consensus on the best argument for each of the cardinal doctrines of special metaphysics does not mean that they will not do so in the future. Indeed, we will see in the next section that one of Kant's criticisms of Hume turns on a similar argument. But since Kant's position is that each of these rules is necessary for a successful transcendental proof, his argument that proofs from pure reason cannot adhere to the first is already sufficient to show that the transcendental method of the Critique cannot be used to establish rational knowledge of the objects of special metaphysics. 25 Kant makes clear that he regards Hume's project as first and foremost a critique of (broadly rationalist) metaphysics in a number places, among them A764/B792, 5:12-3, and the footnote at 4:259. For discussion of these and other passages, see Chance 2011.
26 See Chance 2012. 27 It is at here that Kant launches into the discussion of freedom of speech and education that I referred to in the introduction of this essay.
28 Factum means act or deed, and facta is its accusative plural. Watkins (2005: 377-8) provides a similar reading of these passages. 19 See Meier 1752 : §132. Cf. Wolff 2003 I will here ignore Kant's argument that empirical and arbitrary concepts cannot be defined in the same sense that mathematical concepts can. These arguments are interesting, but they are only of secondary importance to the conclusion this section draws about the use of pure reason. 21 The adverb 'given' is meant to contrast these a priori concepts with the a priori constructed concepts of mathematics. 22 Kant first discusses real possibility, although not under this name, in the Postulates of Empirical Thinking in General, but his explicit contrast between logical and real possibility occurs in the chapter on phenomena and noumena. In the A edition of this chapter, Kant uses the terminology of 'logical' and 'transcendental' possibility as opposed to 'logical' and 'real', but the distinction itself is the same in both editions. See A220-4/B267-72 and A244/B302. Kant also briefly mentions the distinction in the footnote at Bxxvi. 23 Kant's views in this section of the Discipline have been explored by interpreters interested in providing a characterization of transcendental arguments. See Gram 1984 , Moore 2010 , and the literature cited therein. 24 Admittedly, this is a weak argument since the fact that rationalist philosophers have not yet reached a consensus on the best argument for each of the cardinal doctrines of special metaphysics does not mean that they will not do so in the future. Indeed, we will see in the next section that one of Kant's criticisms of Hume turns on a similar argument. But since Kant's position is that each of these rules is necessary for a successful transcendental proof, his argument that proofs from pure reason cannot adhere to the first is already sufficient to show that the transcendental method of the Critique cannot be used to establish rational knowledge of the objects of special metaphysics. 25 Kant makes clear that he regards Hume's project as first and foremost a critique of (broadly rationalist) metaphysics in a number places, among them A764/B792, 5:12-3, and the footnote at 4:259. For discussion of these and other passages, see Chance 2011. 26 See Chance 2012. 27 It is at here that Kant launches into the discussion of freedom of speech and education that I referred to in the introduction of this essay. 28 Factum means act or deed, and facta is its accusative plural. Watkins (2005: 377-8) provides a similar reading of these passages. 29 Two questions should be distinguished here. The first is whether Kant's discussion of the facta of reason is meant to be an argument against the skeptical use of reason as a means to eliminate transcendental deception. The second is whether Hume's arguments in the Enquiry and, in particular, in Section IV can be accurately characterized as 'subjecting the facta of reason to examination' (A760/B780 
